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Abstract 
Modern western economies (in the Eurozone and elsewhere) face a number of challenges over the 
coming decades.  Achieving full employment, meeting climate change and other key environmental 
targets, and reducing inequality rank amongst the highest of these.  The conventional route to 
achieving these goals has been to pursue economic growth. But this route has created two critical 
problems for modern economies. The first is that higher growth leads (ceteris parabis) to higher 
environmental impact. The second is that fragility in financial balances has accompanied relentless 
demand expansion.  
The prevailing global response to the first problem has been to encourage a decoupling of output 
from impacts by investing in green technologies (green growth). But this response runs the risk of 
exacerbating problems associated with the over-leveraging of households, firms and governments 
and places undue confidence in unproven and imagined technologies. An alternative approach is to 
reduce the pace of growth and to restructure economies around green services (post-growth). But 
the potential dangers of declining growth rates lie in increased inequality and in rising 
unemployment. Some more fundamental arguments have also been made against the feasibility of 
interest-bearing debt within a post-growth economy.   
The work described in this paper was motivated by the need to address these fundamental 
dilemmas and to inform the debate that has emerged in recent years about the relative merits of 
green growth and post-growth scenarios. In pursuit of this aim we have developed a suite of 
macroeconomic models based on the methodology of Post-Keynesian Stock Flow Consistent (SFC) 
system dynamics.  Taken together these models represent the first steps in constructing a new 
macroeconomic synthesis capable of exploring the economic and financial dimensions of an 
economy confronting resource or environmental constraints. Such an ecological macroeconomics 
includes an account of basic macroeconomic variables such as the GDP, consumption, investment, 
saving, public spending, employment, and productivity. It also accounts for the performance of the 
economy in terms of financial balances, net lending positions, money supply, distributional equity 
and financial stability.  
This report illustrates the utility of this new approach through a number of specific analyses and 
scenario explorations. These include an assessment of the Piketty hypothesis (that slow growth 
increases inequality), an analysis of the ‘growth imperative’ hypothesis (that interest bearing debt 
requires economic growth for stability), and an analysis of the financial and monetary implications of 
green investment policies. The work also assesses the scope for fiscal policy to improve social and 
environmental outcomes.     
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1 Introduction  
The WWWforEurope project  is a large-scale collaborative project with a common interest in the 
socio-economic transition to sustainability. The overall objective of Work Package 205 is to develop 
models to support a quantitative understanding of the socio-economic transition towards 
sustainability.  
Milestone 38 (Jackson et al 2014) outlined the development of two separate strands of modelling 
work, one using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) approach and the other using a 
Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) system dynamics approach. Milestone 39 (Kratena et al 2015) reports on 
the findings from the first approach. The aim of Milestone 40 is to report on the outcomes from the 
SFC modelling strand.     
Section 2 of the report elaborates on the motivation for the modelling approach. It sets out the 
challenges associated with modelling the transition to sustainability and articulates the need for an 
‘ecological macroeconomics’.   
Section 3 describes the broad principles of SFC modelling, drawing on the pioneering work of Wynne 
Godley and his collaborators. Though increasingly employed within the Post-Keynesian economic 
paradigm, SFC modelling is not particularly well-known beyond that field and has only recently 
begun to be used to model social or ecological aspects of the economy.  This milestone aims to 
demonstrate the value of the approach in understanding the transition to a sustainable economy.  
Sections 4 to 7 describe four distinct modelling exercises undertaken by the authors of this report 
using an SFC framework. The first of these explores the so-called ‘Piketty hypothesis’ that declining 
growth rates lead to rising inequality.  The second examines the question whether or not the 
existence of interest-bearing debt necessarily creates a ‘growth imperative’.  The third model 
explores the financial and monetary implications of a large-scale green investment programme. The 
fourth model develops the combined challenge of substituting for fossil fuels in the context of social 
and economic goals.   
Section 8 summarises the findings from the overall work programme and discusses the implications 
for debates about green growth and post-growth economies.  
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2 Motivating a Stock-Flow Consistent Ecological Macroeconomics 
One of the clearest lessons from the financial crisis is that a narrow focus on real economy indicators 
and policies was insufficient to avert the potentially disastrous consequences triggered by 
weaknesses in the US housing market, the proliferation of financial derivatives, and the subsequent 
collapse of Lehman brothers in September 2008.  The fragility instilled within the financial system as 
a result of over-heated asset markets, over-leveraged balance sheets, and over-complex financial 
instruments went largely unnoticed in a policy environment focused primarily on aggregate 
indicators such as the GDP, employment rates, inflation and consumer spending (Jackson 2016, 
Tuner 2015, Wolf 2014).   
 
The failure of almost all mainstream economists to foresee the global financial crisis of 2008/9 
represents a remarkable failure of financial governance (Bezemer 2009, 2010).  Just a year before 
the onset of the great recession the then chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke 
reported to the U.S. House of Representatives (Bernanke, 2007) that ‘the U.S. economy appears 
likely to expand at a moderate pace over the second half of 2007, with growth then strengthening a 
bit in 2008 to a rate close to the economy's underlying trend.’ Global financial institutions were also 
taken unawares. In August 2007, the IMF was able to argue that ‘notwithstanding recent financial 
market nervousness, the global economy remains on track for continued robust growth in 2007 and 
2008, although at a somewhat more moderate pace than 2006. Moreover, downside risks to the 
economic outlook seem less threatening than at the time of the September 2006 World Economic 
Outlook.’ (IMF 2007). 
  
These oversights amount to a systematic failure to integrate a coherent description of the financial 
economy into models and policy prescriptions for the real economy (Keen 2011). The crisis revealed 
painfully that the apparent economic success of the ‘great moderation’ was largely built on a 
growing fragility in the balance sheets of firms, households and nation states (Barwell and Burrows 
2011, Koo 2011). But these risks remained invisible to most economists and unpredicted by the 
majority of economic models. In the wake of the crisis, economists have therefore placed a renewed 
importance on the task of understanding the behaviour (and in particular the stability or instability) 
of the financial economy and integrating this understanding into the workings of the real economy. 
A host of new research initiatives and the re-emergence of some earlier schools of thought bears 
witness to this new turn in economics.2
 
  
Another notable shortcoming of traditional economic models is the failure to account properly for 
the stocks and flows of natural resources (the ecosystem services) on which economic activity 
ultimately depends.  The period of the great moderation also witnessed a progressive decline in 
environmental quality across the world: in particular, in relation to global climate change, 
biodiversity loss, the deforestation and desertification of semi-arid regions, the eutrophication of 
water supplies and the over-exploitation of mineral resources (MEA 2005, MGI 2013, Rockström et 
al 2009, Steffen et al 2015, TEEB 2010, IPCC 2014, Wiedmann et al 2013). These limitations are well-
                                                          
2  See for example: Cassiers et al 2014, Jackson 2009/2016; Jackson and Victor 2013; Keen 2011; Minsky 
1994; Turner 2013, 2015; Van den Bergh 2011; Victor 2008; Wray 2012. 
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rehearsed in the literature from ecological economics (Daly 1972, Meadows et al 1972, Costanza 
1989, Daly 1996, Costanza et al 1997). But attempts to redress them have been partial at best.  
 
One of the reasons for this is a fundamental dilemma which haunts debates about a sustainable 
economy. Conventional formulations for achieving prosperity rely on a continual expansion of 
consumer demand. More is deemed better in the received wisdom, even when the wellbeing 
outcomes from increasingly material lives are tenuous. But expanding consumer demand has clearly 
increased the global throughput of materials and the consumption of fossil fuels and now threatens 
the sustainability of the ecosystems on which prosperity depends. Continued growth of the kind 
seen hitherto is patently unsustainable (Jackson 2009, 2016; Hinterberger et al 2011; Pirgsmaier et al 
2010; Victor 2008).    
 
On the other hand, slowing down, or reversing economic growth appears unpalatable too. Income 
growth is clearly still needed in the poorest countries at least, where it is highly correlated with real 
wellbeing outcomes.  Even in the richest economies, growth in GDP is often regarded as the single 
most important policy indicator of progress. When growth falters, as it did in the crisis of 2008/9 
incomes fall, high-street spending is reduced and production output falls. Businesses have less to 
invest, governments have lower tax revenues, social investment is withdrawn, people lose their jobs 
and the economy begins to fall into a spiral of recession.  In short, growth may be unsustainable, but 
de-growth appears to be unstable.     
 
Responding to the dilemma of remaining within the ‘safe operating space’ (Rockström 2009, Steffen 
et al 2015) of a finite planet in a growth-based economy has often been construed by economists 
primarily as a microeconomic task — one that governments can address with conventional fiscal 
instruments of tax and subsidy. The ‘external’ costs associated with economic activities should be 
‘internalized’ in market prices, according to familiar axioms (Pigou 1920, Pearce et al 1989, Pearce 
and Turner 1990, Ekins 1992). Incorporating ‘shadow prices’ for environmental goods into market 
prices will send a clear signal to consumers and investors about the real costs of resource 
consumption and ecological damage, and incentivize investment in alternatives, according to this 
conventional wisdom.  
 
But this prescription has been hard to implement over the last decades. Politicians have shied away 
from both ecological taxation and green investment for a variety of reasons – including fears that 
they will damage growth. Recent attempts to overcome this fear have largely focused on arguing 
that the impacts of green investment will be either negligible or even positive in terms of stimulating 
growth (NCE 2014). But it remains an uncomfortable fact that fragile private and public sector 
balance sheets have slowed down investment in the real economy generally, let alone the additional 
(and less familiar) investment needed to make a transition to a sustainable economy. Conventional 
responses have focused instead on cutting public spending (austerity) and stimulating consumption 
growth (consumer spending) as the basis for economic recovery. Unfortunately, these responses 
tend to ignore the structural problems of the conventional paradigm and delay further the 
investment needed to make the transition to a sustainable green economy.   
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This transition demands a quite specific investment portfolio which is quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from the investment portfolio that has characterised the prevailing economic system. In 
spite of a six-fold increase in renewable energy investment over the last decade (UNEP 2015), 
existing portfolios still tend to be dominated by speculation on asset prices on the one hand and by 
the extraction and depletion of natural resources on the other. Easy returns in the first category are 
gained at the cost of unstable asset prices and rising inequality (Credit Suisse 2014, nef 2015). Easy 
returns in the second are achieved only at the expense of resource depletion and environmental 
degradation (UNEP 2014).  As these easy returns begin to dissipate, the dominance of extractive 
investments leads to portfolios weakened by stranded assets (HSBC 2012) with potentially 
destabilising effects on future financial markets.   
 
By contrast, the investment portfolio for a sustainable economy consists in building long-term assets 
in low carbon technology and infrastructure, in resource-efficient manufacturing, in service 
provision, in health care, in education, in public spaces and social goods, and in the protection and 
restoration of habitats, forests, wetlands, soils and other natural assets.  Some of these asset types 
may offer very conventional benefits with rates of return comparable to existing portfolios.  Others 
however will impose considerable challenges on existing institutional structures and financial 
architectures because their very real environmental and social benefits are not reflected in market 
prices and financial returns.  
 
The scale and nature of this dilemma suggest that the combined challenges of climate change, 
environmental pressure, and resource scarcity require macroeconomic as well as microeconomic 
responses. In fact, there is a need to develop a fully consistent ecological macroeconomics in which 
it is possible to maintain financial stability, ensure high levels of employment, improve the 
distribution of income and wealth and yet remain within the ecological constraints and resource 
limits of a finite planet.  
 
In short, it is clear that an approach to macroeconomics configured only by ‘real economy’ 
aggregates such as output, productivity, employment, consumption and public spending, is 
insufficient to ensure economic sustainability, let alone social or environmental sustainability. Nor is 
it sufficient for monetary policy to consist largely in laissez faire regulation of financial markets 
combined with central bank interest rate policy aimed solely at ‘inflation targeting’. These forms of 
monetary policy were plainly deficient in averting the crisis and insufficient to provide recovery from 
it.  For two decade before the crisis, this same architecture signally failed to provide a financial 
landscape amenable to the investment needs of an environmentally sustainable and socially 
equitable economy. Building a more appropriate financial system needs to start from a clear 
understanding of the investment needs associated with the transition to sustainable economy.        
 
Numerous questions emerge as a result of this analysis. These include questions: about the 
organisation and structure of asset portfolios; about the balance between public and private finance; 
about the balance between equity and debt; about the structure and distribution of asset 
ownership; about the impacts of elevated investments on prices, on wages and on consumer 
demand; and about the appropriate forms of horizontal and vertical money.  Clearly, addressing 
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these questions demands attention to both the real and the financial economy.  Explicitly, it also 
requires a framework that integrates both of these aspects of the economy – in the context of 
ecological and resource constraints.  The aim of this paper is describe several approaches to this 
over-arching problem, building on the theoretical framework of stock-flow consistent (SFC) 
macroeconomic modelling.  
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3 A Stock-Flow Consistent System Dynamics Framework 
The intellectual foundation for the modelling work reported in this Milestone derive from a view of 
macroeconomics developed within post-Keynesian economic theory. We draw in particular from the 
Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) approach to macro-economics, pioneered by Copeland (1949) and 
developed extensively by Wynne Godley and others over the last decades (Godley and Lavoie 2007, 
Lavoie and Godley 2001, Lavoie and Zezza 2012).3
The overall rationale of the SFC approach is to account consistently for all monetary flows between 
agents and sectors across the economy.  This rationale can be captured in three broad axioms: first 
that each expenditure from a given actor (or sector) is also the income to another actor (or sector); 
second, that each sector’s financial assets correspond to financial liabilities of at least one other 
sector, with the sum of all assets and liabilities across all sectors equalling zero; and finally, that 
changes in stocks of financial assets are consistently related to flows within and between economic 
sectors.  
  
These simple understandings lead to a set of accounting principles with implications for actors in 
both the real and financial economy which can be used to test any economic model or scenario 
prediction for consistency as a possible solution in the real world. The approach has come to the fore 
in the wake of the financial crisis, precisely because of these consistent accounting principles and the 
transparency they bring to an understanding not just of conventional macroeconomic aggregates 
like the GDP but also of the underlying balance sheets.  It is notable that Godley (1999) was one of 
the few economists who predicted the crisis before it happened. 
The approach is broadly Keynesian in the sense that SFC models tend to be demand-driven, and the 
economy is articulated in terms of a number of inter-related financial sector accounts: households, 
firms, banks, government, central bank and the ‘rest of the world’ (or foreign sector).  The accounts 
of firms and banks are usually further subdivided into current and capital accounts in line with 
national accounting practices. It is also sometimes useful to subdivide individual sectors further.  For 
instance, the household sector can be subdivided into two sectors  (see Section 4 below) in order to 
test the distributional aspects of changes in the real or financial economy.    
Figure 1 illustrates a typical model structure for an SFC model with the familiar ‘circular flow’ of the 
economy visible (in red) towards the bottom left of the diagram. The rather more complex structure 
shown (partially) above and around the circular flow represents financial flows of the monetary 
economy in the banking, government and foreign sectors.   
If the model is stock-flow consistent, the financial flows into and out of each financial sector 
consistently sum to zero at each point of time along the model run.  So, for instance, the incomes of 
households (consisting of wages and profits) must be exactly equal to the outgoings of households 
(including taxes, net interest payments, consumption and investment spending, and net acquisitions 
of financial assets). Likewise, for each other sector in the model.        
                                                          
3  For an overview of the literature on SFC macroeconomic modelling, see Caverzasi and Godin 2015. 
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Figure 1: Illustrative Macroeconomic Structure for SFC Model4
The stock flow consistent approach to money flows within an economy can also be represented in 
tabular form, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows an illustrative (and simplified) 
‘transaction flows’ matrix for a closed economy.   
 
The matrix creates a representation of all the transactions between different financial sectors in a 
given period (typically a year) of economic activity. It will be noticed that the production firms 
account is split into a current account, where revenue and costs are settled, and a capital account 
where the funds for investment reside. This split between current and capital account is also usually 
extended also to financial firms (banks), to the Central Bank, and to the foreign sector.  For 
illustrative purposes we omit these accounts in Table 1. 
                                                          
4  This diagram is taken from the version of the FALSTAFF model reported in sections 5 and 6, which was developed 
using the interactive systems dynamics software STELLA at the University of Surrey in collaboration with York 
University Toronto (Jackson and Victor 2015).   
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   Households (h) Firms (f) Financial sector (b) Central Bank  Gov (g) RoW (r) ∑   Current Capital Current Capital (cb)    Consumption (C) −𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶       0 Gov spending (G)  𝐺𝐺     −𝐺𝐺  0 Investment (I) −𝐼𝐼ℎ  𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 + 𝐼𝐼ℎ  −𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓       0 Exports (X) and imports (M)  𝑋𝑋 −𝑀𝑀      𝑀𝑀 − 𝑋𝑋 0 Wages (W) 𝑊𝑊 −𝑊𝑊       0 Profits (F) +𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏  −𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓  +𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  −𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏      0 Taxes (T) −𝑇𝑇ℎ  −𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 − 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝      𝑇𝑇  0 Interest on Loans (L) −𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿−1ℎ  −𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿−1  +𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿−1     0 Interest on Deposits (D) +𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷−1ℎ  +𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷−1𝑓𝑓   −𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷−1    +𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷−1𝑓𝑓  0 Interest on Bonds (B) +𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵−1ℎ    +𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵−1𝑏𝑏   +𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵−1𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏  −𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵−1 +𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵−1𝑓𝑓  0 Change in Advances (A)     +𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 −𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥   0 Change in Reserves (R)     −𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 +𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥   0 Change in deposits (D) −𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷ℎ     +𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷    0 Change in bonds (B) −𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵ℎ     −𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏  −𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏  +𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵 −𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓  0 Change in equities (E) −𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸  +𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸      0 Change in loans (L) +𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿ℎ   +𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓       0 Change in mortgages (M) +𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀    −𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀    0 Change in pensions (N) −𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥    +𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥    0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Table 1:Illustrative Transaction Matrix for SFC Modelling 
 
 
 
Milestone 40 – Final version March 2016 
 
 
 
11 | P a g e  
 
 
 
The transaction matrix incorporates an account of the incomes and expenditures in the national 
economy, reflecting directly the structure of the system of national accounts.  Thus the first ten rows 
in Table 1 illustrate the flow accounts of each sector.  In terms of the household sector, for example, 
it can be seen that households receive money in the form of wages and distributed profits from 
production firms, while spending money on consumption and taxes.  
It is to be observed that the first six rows of the Firms sector (column 3 in Table1) present a 
simplified form of the conventional GDP accounting identity:  
𝐶𝐶 +  𝐺𝐺 +  𝐼𝐼 =  𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 =  𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝑊𝑊 +  𝑃𝑃  1) 
where 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒  represents the expenditure-based formulation of the Gross Domestic Product and 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  
represents the income based GDP formulation.   
The lower portion of Table 1 shows the changes in financial assets and liabilities between sectors.  So 
for example the net lending of the households sector (the sum of rows 1 to 10 in column 2 of Table 
1) is distributed amongst four different kinds of financial assets in this illustration: deposits, 
government bonds and equities.  Note that this Table is for illustrative purposes only.  Actual 
allocations in FALSTAFF include other options, including the taking of loans and mortgages by 
households.   
A key feature of the transaction matrix, indeed the core principle at the heart of SFC modelling, is 
that each of the rows and each of the columns must always sum to zero.  If the model is correctly 
constructed, these zero balances should not change over time as the simulation progress.  The 
accounting identities shown in Table 1 therefore allow for a consistency check, to ensure that the 
simulations actually represent possible states of the monetary economy.  
Associated with the transactions illustrated in the bottom five rows of Table 1 are changes in the 
capital accounts of each economic sector.  For each transaction in financial assets between two 
sectors of the economy there is an associated change in the balance sheet of the same two sectors.  
For instance, a decision by the household sector to increase deposits at banks will increase the 
deposit assets of households while simultaneously increasing deposit liabilities at banks.   
The balance sheet of an economy (Table 2 below) may be thought of as providing a record of all 
previous transactions upon which the transactions in the current period are added. Changes in the 
balance sheet from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t are therefore the result of 
transactions occurring in period t.  Typically balance sheet data are collated and reported on an 
annual basis in the national accounts. One of the key financial axioms illustrated in Table 2 is that the 
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sum of all financial assets and liabilities in the economy is zero.  The only net assets are non-
financial, derived from fixed (and non-produced) capital.5
  
   
Households Firms Banks Gov't Σ 
Loans 
 
-L +L 
 
0 
Deposits (D) +D 
 
-D 
 
0 
Bonds (B) +Bh 
 
+Bb -B 0 
Equities (E) +e . pe -ef . pe 
  
0 
Fixed capital (K) +Kh +Kf 
  
+K 
Net worth (NW) NWh NWf NWb NWg K 
Table 2: Illustrative Balance Sheet Matrix for a Closed Economy 
As indicated in the introduction, this milestone reports on two distinct programmes of work which 
have contributed to the outputs from the WWWforEurope project.  The first of these is the 
modelling approach pursued by Surrey which builds on an on-going project led by Prof Tim Jackson 
and Prof Peter Victor (York University, Toronto) to develop a stock-flow consistent (SFC) ecological 
macro-economics. The broad approach has several distinct features.  
In the first place, it draws together three primary spheres of modelling interest and explores the 
interactions between them.  These spheres are: 1) the ecological and resource constraints on 
economic activity; 2) a full account of production, consumption, employment and public finances in 
the ‘real economy’ at the level of the nation state; 3) a comprehensive account of the money 
economy, including the main interactions between financial agents, and the creation, flow and 
destruction of the money supply itself. Interactions within and between these spheres of interest are 
modelled, using a system dynamics framework.6
A further key feature of the Surrey approach is the focus of attention on the individual nation state.  
A premise of the work is that the ‘dilemma of growth’ has particular ramifications for national policy 
and is best explored at that level. The growth of GDP or national income in a particular country is not 
  
                                                          
5  These real assets are usually restricted to assets produced by the economy which have a market value eg 
housing, roads, schools. Other valuable assets such as the land base and mineral deposits are often excluded 
although efforts are underway to expand national balance sheets to include them. (e.g. United Nations et al 
2003)    
6  The primary modelling platform used by the research team is a system dynamics platform known as STELLA. Data 
collation organised in Excel and econometric calibration is carried out in Eviews.  
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just a significant policy indicator in its own right, it is also a measure of production output and 
consumption possibilities, as well as being related to a country’s ability to provide citizens with work, 
finance its social investment, and compete in global markets. Admittedly, all of these questions 
could also be (and often are) asked at supra-national or sub-national level.  Since the development 
of a unified System of National Accounts (UN 1993, 2008), however, the most comprehensive, 
reliable and consistent data sets tend to be available at country and national level.   
The work led by Surrey has so far developed three related macro-economic models. The SIGMA 
model (Section 4) employs a somewhat simplified version of the broader modelling structure to 
explore the relationship between savings, inequality and growth in a macroeconomic framework.  
We address in particular the hypothesis advanced by Thomas Piketty that declining growth rates 
lead inevitably towards rising social inequality.   
The FALSTAFF model (Sections 5 and 6) is a more extensive representation of the macro-economy 
incorporating a wider variety of financial assets and liabilities in a stock-flow consistent framework.  
We illustrate the use of FALSTAFF by exploring (Section 5) the so-called ‘growth imperative’ which is 
supposed (Binswanger 2009 eg) to arise from the creation of money alongside interest-bearing debt, 
and also (Section 6) the financial and monetary implications of large-scale green investment 
scenarios.    
Finally, the GEMMA model (which is still under development – see Section 8) builds on the FALSTAFF 
framework to include greater inter-industry structure and more extended behavioural dynamics – 
including for instance an econometrically estimated portfolio allocation function for household 
assets and liabilities.   
The second strand of work has been developed independently through the University of Vienna.  The 
ECOGRO model (Section 7) is a stock-flow consistent model calibrated to the level of the EU as a 
whole. It incorporates two specific environmental extensions to the conventional stock-flow 
consistent framework. One of these expands the structure of nonfinancial firms to incorporate a 
separate energy sector. The other incorporates an environmental damage function which impacts on 
the capital stock.     
The following sections of the paper provide an overview of the different approaches taken and 
report in the findings.  Further details on each approach are to be found in the references. 
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4 Does slow growth lead to rising inequality?  
The French economist, Thomas Piketty (2014), has received widespread acclaim for his book Capital 
in the 21st Century, which highlights the rising inequality experienced particularly in developed 
economies, during the last decades. What is striking about this rise, as Piketty notes, is that it is 
entirely contrary to the supposed Kuznets’ hypothesis, that inequality first increases, as economies 
develop, and then declines once they have reached a certain point (Kuznets 1955).  Developed 
economies showed this decline until about the 1970s, but since that point the decline has been 
reversed and inequality now stands at a level similar to what it was a century ago.   
 
Explaining this apparent paradox is a part of Piketty’s intentions. Building on over 700 pages of 
painstaking statistical analysis, the central thesis of the book is nonetheless relatively 
straightforward to describe. Piketty argues that the increase in inequality witnessed in recent 
decades is a direct result of the slowing down of economic growth in modern capitalist economies. 
Under circumstances in which growth rates decline further, he suggests, this challenge would be 
exacerbated.  
 
Piketty advances his argument through the formulation of two ‘fundamental laws’ of capitalism. The 
first of these (Piketty 2014: 52 et seq) relates the capital stock (more precisely the capital to income 
ratio 𝛽𝛽) to the share of income α flowing to the owners of capital. Specifically, the first fundamental 
law of capitalism says that:7
 
  
𝛼𝛼 =  𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽,     (1) 
 
where r is the rate of return on capital. Since 𝛽𝛽 is defined as K/Y where K is capital and Y is income, it 
is easy to see that this ‘law’ is, as Piketty acknowledges, an accounting identity:  
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 =  𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟.     (2) 
 
Formally speaking, the income accruing to capital equals the total capital multiplied by the rate of 
return on that capital. Though this ‘law’ on its own does not force the economy in one direction or 
another, it provides the foundation from which to explore the evolution of historical relationships 
between capital, income and rates of return.  In particular, it can be seen from this identity that for 
                                                          
7  In what follows, we suppress specific reference to time-dependency of variables except where absolutely 
necessary. Thus all variables should be read as time dependent unless specifically denominated with a 
subscripted suffix 0. Occasionally, we will have reason to use the subscripted suffix (-1) to denote the first lag of a 
time-dependent variable.  
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any given rate of return r the share of income accruing to the owners of capital rises as the capital to 
income ratio rises.8
 
  
It is the second of Piketty’s ‘fundamental laws of capitalism’ (op cit: 168 et seq; see also Piketty 
2010) that generates particular concern in the context of declining growth rates. This law states that 
in the long run, the capital to income ratio β tends towards the ratio of the savings rate s to the 
growth rate g, ie:  
 
     𝛽𝛽 → 𝑠𝑠
𝑔𝑔
 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡 → ∞.    (3) 
 
This asymptotic law suggests that, as growth rates fall towards zero, the capital to income ratio will 
tend to rise dramatically – depending of course on what happens to savings rates. Taken together 
with the first law, equation (3) suggests that over the long term, capital’s share of income is 
governed by the following relationship:  
 
     𝛼𝛼 →  𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠
𝑔𝑔
 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡 → ∞.     (4) 
 
In other words, as growth declines, the rising capital to income ratio 𝛽𝛽 leads to an increasing share 
of income going to capital and a declining share of income going to labour. It is important to stress 
that the relationships (3) and (4) are long-term equilibria to which the economy evolves, provided 
that the savings rate s and the growth rate g stay constant.  As Piketty points out, ‘the accumulation 
of wealth takes time: it will take several decades for the law β = s/g to become true’ (op cit: 168). In 
any real economy, the growth rate g and the savings rate s are likely to be changing continually, so 
that at any point in time, the economy is striving towards, but may never in fact achieve, the 
asymptotic result.   
 
Piketty’s hypothesis poses a particular challenge to those economists who have been critical of 
society’s ‘GDP fetish’ (Stiglitz et al 2009) and sought to establish alternative approaches (Daly 1996, 
Victor 2008, Jackson 2009, Rezai et al 2013, d’Alisa et al 2014) in which socio-economic goals are 
achieved without assuming continual throughput growth. Certainly, the prospects for ‘prosperity 
without growth’ (Jackson 2009) would appear slim at best if Piketty’s thesis were unconditionally 
true.  The Piketty hypothesis is also problematic in the face of a potential ‘secular stagnation’ 
(Gordon 2012), in which declining growth rates are a feature of the national or global macro-
economy.    
                                                          
8  We will see later that the ceteris paribus clause relating to constant r here is important. In fact, the rate of return 
will typically change as the capital to income ratio rises; and to the extent that this ratio declines with increasing 
β, it can potentially mitigate the accumulation of the capital share of income.  
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In order to explore further the Piketty hypothesis, Jackson and Victor (2016) developed a closed, 
SFC, demand-driven model of Savings, Investment and Growth in a Macroeconomic framework 
(SIGMA). SIGMA was used to test for the implications of a slowdown of growth on a) capital’s share 
of income and b) the distribution of incomes in the economy.  Policy options to reduce inequality 
were also examined.   
 
SIGMA has four financial sectors: households, government, firms and banks. Firms’ and banks’ 
accounts are divided between current and capital accounts and the households sector is further 
subdivided into two subsectors (which we denominate as ‘workers’ and ‘capitalists’) in order to 
explore potential inequalities in the distribution of incomes and of wealth. By adding a government 
sector to the model, we are able to explore the potential to mitigate regressive impacts through a 
progressive taxation system. The inclusion of a banking sector allows us to establish clear 
relationships between the real and the financial economy and discuss questions of household 
wealth. Before describing SIGMA in more detail, we first summarise Piketty’s argument.  
 
The model itself is built using the system dynamics software STELLA. This kind of software provides a 
useful platform for exploring economic systems for several reasons, not the least of which is the 
ease of undertaking collaborative, interactive work in a visual (iconographic) environment. Further 
advantages are the transparency with which one can model fully dynamic relationships and mirror 
the stock-flow consistency that underlies our approach to macroeconomic modelling.  
 
Following much of the SFC literature, the model is broadly Keynesian in the sense that it is demand-
driven. Our approach is to establish a level of overall demand through an exogenous growth rate, 𝑔𝑔, 
and to generate the level of investment through an exogenous savings rate, 𝑠𝑠. We then explore the 
impacts of changes in these variables over time on the income shares from capital and labour 
through an endogenous rate of return, 𝑓𝑓, on capital. To achieve this we employ a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) production function, not to drive output as in a conventional neoclassical 
model, but to derive the marginal productivity 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟  of capital 𝑟𝑟 and also to establish the labour 
employment associated with a given level of aggregate demand.9
 
  
To illustrate our arguments without unnecessary complications, we work with a simplified version of 
the more complex structure that we have developed elsewhere. First, as noted, the SIGMA economy 
is closed with respect to overseas trade. Next, we assume that government always balances the 
                                                          
9  We are aware of course of the limitations of using a broadly neoclassical production function (Cohen and 
Harcourt 2003, Robinson 1953). However, retaining this aspect of Piketty’s analysis allows us to compare our 
findings more directly with his.      
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fiscal budget and holds no outstanding debt, so that government spending, 𝐺𝐺, is equal to taxes, 𝑇𝑇, 
levied only on households.  
 
Finally, we employ a rather simple balance sheet structure, sufficient only to get a handle on 
changes in household wealth under different patterns of ownership of capital. Households assets are 
held either as deposits, 𝐷𝐷, in banks or as equities, 𝐸𝐸, in firms. The only other item on the balance 
sheet is loans, 𝐿𝐿, made by banks to non-financial firms. The banking sector plays a relatively 
straightforward role as a financial intermediary, providing deposit facilities for households and loans 
to firms.  
 
Clearly none of these assumptions is accurate as a full description of a modern capitalist economy, 
but all of them can be relaxed in more sophisticated versions of our framework and none of them 
obstructs our purposes in this study.   
 
Household savings are distributed between new bank deposits, 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷, and the purchase of equities, 
𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸, from firms. It is assumed for simplicity that the demand for new equities by households is equal 
to the supply of new equities by firms and that these in their turn are determined via a desired debt 
to equity ratio in firms.10
  
 The distribution of equity purchases between capitalist and worker 
households is deemed to be in the same proportion as the net savings of each sector. Changes in 
deposits are then calculated as a residual from net savings.  
In order to model the evolution of the SIGMA economy over time, we follow Piketty by  defining the 
evolution of the net national income 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼 according to an (exogenous) growth rate 𝑔𝑔 such that:  
 
𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝑔𝑔) ∗ 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼(−1)    (5)  
 
where 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼(−1) is the value in the previous period (ie the first lag) of the variable 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼. In some 
scenarios 𝑔𝑔 will take a fixed value 𝑔𝑔0 throughout the period 𝜏𝜏 of the scenario,11
 
 while in others 𝑔𝑔 will 
decline uniformly from 𝑔𝑔0 to zero over time t. 
Testing Piketty’s hypothesis requires that we establish the rate of return to capital, 𝑓𝑓, which in turn 
allows us to determine the split between wages and firms profits in the net national income. Along 
with Piketty (2014a: 213-214), we assume (for now) that the return to capital is given by the 
marginal productivity of capital, which we denote by 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟. This assumption only works under market 
                                                          
10  In contrast to our treatment elsewhere (Jackson and Victor 2015), this means that there is no speculative 
purchasing of equities that might lead to capital gains and losses.   
11  In this paper we take𝜏𝜏 = 100, ie the scenarios run over 100 years.   
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conditions in which there are no structural features which might lead either capital or labour to 
extort more than their ‘fair’ share of the output from production. 
 
 In a sense, this assumption is a conservative one for us, to the extent that conclusions about 
inequality are stronger in imperfect market dynamics. Under conditions of duress, in which the 
owners of capital receive a rate of return 𝑓𝑓 greater than the marginal productivity of capital 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟, our 
conclusions about any inequality which results from declining growth rates will be reinforced. 
Conversely, of course, we must beware of making too strong assumptions about the potential to 
mitigate inequality, in any situation in which the owners of capital have greater bargaining power 
than wage labour.   
 
The results of our analysis are described in detail in Jackson and Victor (2016) and summarised in 
Figures 2 and 3.  The analysis confirms that, under certain conditions, it is indeed possible for both 
capital’s share of income and income inequality to rise substantially as growth rates decline. 
However, we have also established that there is absolutely no inevitability at all that a declining 
growth rate leads to explosive (or even increasing) levels of inequality.  
 
 
Figure 2: The variation of capital’s share of income with elasticity of substitution of capital 
Source: Jackson and Victor 2016 
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Even under a highly-skewed initial distribution of ownership of productive assets, it is entirely 
possible to envisage scenarios in which incomes converge over the longer-term, with relatively 
modest intervention from progressive taxation policies.  Specifically when the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour is low (0.5), with a differential tax rate of 40% on higher 
level incomes and a modest tax on capital assets (around 1.25%), it is possible to reduce the 
inequality between ‘workers’ and ‘capitalists’ entirely (Figure 3).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Variations in income inequality under a progressive tax regime 
Source: Jackson and Victor 2016 
 
The most critical factor in this analysis is the elasticity of substitution, 𝜎𝜎, between labour and capital. 
This parameter indicates the ease with which it is possible to substitute capital for labour in the 
economy as relative prices change. Higher levels of substitutability (𝜎𝜎 > 1) do indeed exhibit the 
kind of rapid increases in inequality predicted by Piketty, as growth rates decline. In an economy 
with a lower elasticity of substitution (0 < 𝜎𝜎 < 1), the dangers are much less acute. The ease with 
which capital can be substituted for labour is thus an indicator of the propensity for low growth 
environments to lead to rising inequality. More rigid capital-labour divisions on the other hand 
appear to reinforce our ability to reduce societal inequality.   
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From a conventional economic viewpoint, this might appear to be cold comfort. Lower values of σ 
are often equated with lower levels of development. As Piketty points out (2014a: 222), low levels of 
elasticity characterised traditional agricultural societies. Other authors have suggested that the 
direction of modern development, in general, is associated with rising elasticities between labour 
and capital (Karagiannis et al 2005).  Antony (2009a) and Palivos (2008) both argue that typical 
empirical values of 𝜎𝜎 are less than one for developing countries and above one for developed 
countries. The suggestion in the literature appears to be that progress comprises a continual shift 
towards higher levels of σ. But this contention embodies numerous ideological assumptions.  In 
particular it seems to be consistent with a particular form of capitalism that has characterised the 
post-war period: a form of capitalism that has come under increasing scrutiny for its potent failures, 
not the least of which is the extent to which it has presided over continuing inequality (Davidson 
2013, Galbraith 2013).   
 
The possibility of re-examining this assumption resonates strongly with suggestions in the literature 
for addressing the challenge of maintaining full employment under declining growth. In our own 
work, for example, we have responded to this challenge by highlighting the importance of labour-
intensive services both in reducing material burdens across society and also in creating employment 
in the face of declining growth (Jackson 2009; Jackson and Victor 2011). The findings from the 
SIGMA model support this view. In fact, with constant labour productivity growth of 1.8% per 
annum, unemployment rises to over 70% in the SIGMA scenarios (Figure 4: scenario 1), a situation 
that would clearly be disastrous for any society.  
 
Suppose, however, that labour productivity were not to grow continually. This could potentially lead 
to an important avenue of opportunity for structural change in pursuit of sustainability. Instead of a 
relentless pursuit of ever-increasing labour productivity, economic policy would aim to protect 
employment as a priority and recognise that the time spent in labour is a vital component of the 
value of many economic activities (Jackson 2011). Increased employment opportunities would be 
achieved through a structural transition to more labour intensive sectors of the economy (Jackson 
and Victor 2011). This would make particular sense for service-based activities – for instance in the 
care, craft and cultural sectors – where the value of the activities resides largely in the time people 
devote to them. In policy terms, such a transition would involve protecting the quality and intensity 
of people’s time in the workplace from the interests of aggressive capital. Such a proposal is not a 
million miles from Minsky’s (1986) suggestion that government should act as ‘employer of last 
resort’ in stabilising an unstable economy.   
 
Scenarios 2 to 4 in Figure 4 all describe a situation in which by the end of the run, labour productivity 
growth has declined to a point where it is slightly negative. By the end of the scenario, labour 
productivity itself is declining in the economy – production output is becoming more labour 
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intensive. Figure 4 reveals that this decline in labour productivity growth is not in itself sufficient to 
ensure acceptable levels of unemployment. For higher values of σ, unemployment is still running 
dangerously high. But for lower values of σ it is possible not only to maintain but even to improve 
the level of employment in the economy, in spite of a decline in the growth rate to zero.  
 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment scenarios under declining growth 
Source: Jackson and Victor 2016 
 
There is however a tantalising suggestion inherent in this analysis that changing the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital offers another potential avenue towards a more sustainable 
macro-economy, and in particular a way of mitigating the pernicious impacts of inequality and 
unemployment in a low growth economy. Exploring that suggestion fully is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but is discussed further in Jackson and Victor 2016.  
 
We should also recall here our assumption that the rate of return to capital is equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital.  As we remarked earlier, this assumption only holds in markets conditions 
where capital is unable to use its power to command a higher share of income. Clearly, in some of 
the scenarios we have envisaged, this assumption may no longer hold. Where political power 
accumulates alongside the accumulation of capital, the danger of rising inequality is particularly 
severe and is no longer offset simply by changes in the economic structure. This question also 
warrants further analysis.  
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In summary, the SIGMA model explores the relationship between growth, savings and income 
inequality, under a variety of assumptions about the nature and structure of the economy.  Our 
principal finding is that rising inequality is by no means inevitable, even in the context of declining 
growth rates. A key policy conclusion concerns the need to protect wage labour against aggressive 
cost-reducing strategies to favour the interests of capital. This measure would have the additional 
benefit of maintaining high employment, even in a low- or degrowth economy.   
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5 FALSTAFF Part 1 – Credit creation and the ‘growth imperative’ 
It has been argued that capitalism has an inherent ‘growth imperative’: in other words, that there 
are certain features of capitalism which are inimical to a stationary state12
 
 of the real economy. This 
argument has its roots in the writings of Karl Marx (1867) and Rosa Luxemburg (1913) and there are 
good reasons to take it seriously. For instance, under certain conditions, the desire of entrepreneurs 
to maximise profits will lead to the pursuit of labour productivity gains in production. Fewer workers 
are required to produce the same output, year on year.  Provided that aggregate demand keeps 
rising, it is still possible to maintain high employment.  But if aggregate demand falters, as it has 
done recently, then the demand for labour will also fall, leading to a ‘productivity trap’ (Jackson and 
Victor 2011) with rising unemployment.   
Our concern in this section is to address one particular aspect of the growth imperative: namely, the 
question of interest-bearing debt.  A variety of authors have suggested that when money is created 
in parallel with interest-bearing debt it inevitably creates a growth imperative. To some, the charging 
of interest on debt is itself an underlying driver for economic growth. In the absence of growth, it is 
argued, it would be impossible to service interest payments and repay debts, which would therefore 
accumulate unsustainably. This claim was made, for instance, by Richard Douthwaite (1990, 2006). 
In The Ecology of Money, Douthwaite (2006) suggests that the ‘fundamental problem with the debt 
method of creating money is that, because interest has to be paid on almost all of it, the economy 
must grow continuously if it is not to collapse.’  
 
This view has been influential amongst a range of economists critical of capitalism, and in particular 
those critical of the system of creation of money through interest-bearing debt. Eisenstein (2012) 
maintains that ‘our present money system can only function in a growing economy. Money is 
created as interest-bearing debt: it only comes into being when someone promises to pay back even 
more of it’.  In similar vein, Farley et al (2013) claim that the ‘current interest-bearing, debt-based 
system of money creation stimulates the unsustainable growth economy’ (op cit: 2803). The same 
authors seek to identify policies that ‘would limit the growth imperative created by an interest-
based credit creation system’ (op cit: 2823).  
 
The popular understanding that  debt-based money as a form of growth imperative is intuitively 
appealing, but has been subject to remarkably little in-depth economic scrutiny. A notable exception 
                                                          
12  We use the term stationary state to describe zero growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  We prefer here 
stationary to steady state, which is also widely used (Daly 2014 eg), for two reasons. First, the term steady state is 
employed in the post-Keynesian literature (Godley and Lavoie 2007) to describe a state of the economy in which 
flows are constant; but this may still entail growth.  A stationary state is used to describe a state in which both 
flows and stocks are constant, in which case there is no growth.  Second, this terminology harks back to early 
classical economists such as Mill (1848), emphasising the pedigree of the idea of a non-growth-based economy. 
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is a landmark paper by Mathias Binswanger (2009), who set out to provide an ‘explanation for a 
growth imperative in modern capitalist economies, which are also credit money economies’ (op cit: 
707). As a result of the ability of commercial banks to create money through the expansion of credit, 
he claims (op cit: 724), ‘a zero growth rate is not feasible in the long run’.  
 
By his own admission, however, Binswanger’s paper ‘does not aim to give a full description of a 
modern capitalist economy’. In particular, he notes (op cit: 711) that his model ‘should be 
distinguished from some recent modeling attempts in the Post Keynesian tradition’ which set out to 
provide ‘comprehensive, fully articulated, theoretical models’ that could serve as a ‘blueprint for an 
empirical representation of a whole economic system’ (Godley 1999: 394). A recent symposium on 
the growth imperative has contributed several new perspectives on Binswanger’s original 
hypothesis, but these papers also fall short of providing a full analysis of this kind (Binswanger 2015, 
Rosenblum 2015). Our aim in this section is to address this limitation, in the context of a stock-flow 
consistent model, calibrated with empirically plausible data.  
 
To this end, we have developed a macroeconomic model of Financial Assets and Liabilities in a Stock 
and Flow consistent Framework (FALSTAFF), calibrated at the level of the national economy (Jackson 
and Victor 2015b). As with the SIGMA model (Section 4), the approach is broadly post-Keynesian in 
the sense that the model is demand-driven and incorporates a consistent account of all monetary 
flows. The full FALSTAFF model is articulated in terms of six inter-related financial sector accounts: 
households, firms, banks, government, central bank and the ‘rest of the world’ (foreign sector). The 
accounts of firms and banks are further subdivided into current and capital accounts in line with 
national accounting practices. The household sector can be further subdivided into two sectors in 
order to test the distributional aspects of changes in the real or financial economy.13
 
 For the 
purposes of this analysis, we have simplified the FALSTAFF structure (denoted here as FALSTAFFS) in 
order to focus specifically on the question of interest-bearing money. For instance, we assume 
balanced trade and restrict the number of categories of assets and liabilities to include only loans, 
deposits, equities and government bonds.  
The broad structure of the FALSTAFFS model is as follows. Aggregate demand is composed of 
household spending, government spending, and the investment expenditure of firms.14
                                                          
13  We have used this subdivision to explore the implications of Piketty’s (2014) hypothesis that inequality increases 
as the growth rate declines (Jackson and Victor 2016). 
 The 
allocation of gross income is split between the depreciation of fixed capital (which is assumed to be 
retained by firms), the return to labour (the wage bill) and the return to capital (profits, dividends 
and interest payments).  
14  For simplicity, we assume for the purposes of this paper a balanced trade position in which exports are equal to 
imports and net trade is zero.  
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Households’ propensity to consume is dependent both on income and on financial wealth (Godley 
and Lavoie 2007). The model also incorporates the possibility of exploring two kinds of exogenous 
‘shocks’ to household spending. In the first, a random adjustment is made to household spending 
throughout the run, within a range of plus or minus 2.5% from the predicted value. In the second, a 
one-off shock either reduces or increases spending by 5% over two consecutive periods early in the 
run. We use these exogenous shocks to test the stability of the stationary state under our default 
assumptions.  
 
Household savings may in principle be distributed between government bonds, firms equities, banks 
equities, bank deposits and loans.15 Household demand for bonds is assumed here to be equal to the 
excess supply of bonds from government, once banks’ demands for bonds are met. Household 
demand for equities is assumed to be equal to the issuance of equities from firms and banks. Thus, 
households are the sole owners of equity in this model and the return on equities is limited to 
dividends received, since there are no capital gains in the model.16
 
 The balance of household 
savings, once bond and equity purchases have been made, is allocated to paying down loans or 
building up deposits. If savings are negative, households may also borrow from banks to finance 
spending.  
Firms are assumed to produce goods and services on demand for households, governments and to 
meet the demand for gross fixed capital investment. Investment decisions are based on a flexible 
accelerator function (Jorgenson 1963, Godley and Lavoie 2007b) in which net investment is assumed 
to be a fixed proportion of the difference between capital stock in the previous period, and a target 
capital stock determined by expected demand and an assumed capital-to-output ratio. A proportion 
of gross profits equal to the depreciation of the capital stock over the previous period is assumed to 
be retained by firms for investment, with net (additional) investment financed through a mixture of 
new loans from banks and the issuance of equities to households, according to a desired debt-to-
equity ratio.   
 
Government receives income from taxation and purchases goods and services (for the benefit of the 
public) from the firms sector. Taxation is only levied on households in this version of the model, at a 
rate which provides for an initially balanced budget under the default values for aggregate demand.  
 
                                                          
15  In the full FALSTAFF framework, household savings are allocated between a range of financial assets (and 
liabilities) including bank deposits, equities, pension funds, government bonds (and mortgage and loans), using 
an econometrically-estimated portfolio allocation model based on the framework originally proposed by Brainard 
and Tobin (1968).  
16  This assumption is relaxed in the full FALSTAFF model, in which both equity prices and housing vary according to 
supply and demand.  These assets are therefore subject to capital gains in the full model.  
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Using these assumptions, Jackson and Victor (2015a) explore three government spending scenarios: 
one in which government spending remains constant throughout the run, one in which government 
spending plus bond interest is equal to tax receipts (ie a strict ‘austerity’ policy in which government 
balances the fiscal budget), and one in which government engages in a ‘countercyclical’ spending 
policy, increasing spending when aggregate demand falls and decreasing it when aggregate demand 
rises. Government bonds are issued to cover deficit spending.  
 
Banks accept deposits and provide loans to households and to firms, as demanded. Bank profits are 
generated from the interest rate spread between deposits and loans, plus interest paid on any 
government bonds they hold. Profits are distributed to households as dividends, except for any 
retained earnings that may be required to meet the capital account ‘financing requirement’.  This 
financing requirement is the difference between deposits (inflows into the capital account) and the 
sum of loans, bond purchases and increases in central bank reserves (outgoings from the capital 
account). The central bank plays a very simple role in the stationary state version of FALSTAFF, 
providing liquidity on demand (in the form of central bank reserves) to commercial banks in 
exchange for government bonds. 
 
FALSTAFFS provides for two regulatory policies that might reasonably be imposed on banks. First, the 
model can impose a ‘capital adequacy’ requirement in which banks are required to hold enough 
‘capital’ to cover a given proportion of risky assets. Second, banks may be subject to a central bank 
‘reserve ratio’ in which reserves are held at the central bank up to a given proportion of deposits 
held on account. Few developed countries retain formal reserve ratios these days, leaving it up to 
the banks themselves to decide what reserves to hold. However, we have included a default reserve 
ratio of 5% in order to test Binswanger’s (2009) hypothesis that this might be one of the factors 
which requires growth in the economy in order to sustain it.  
  
The capital adequacy requirement is supposed to provide resilience in the face of defaulting loans, 
as required for instance under the Basel III framework (BIS 2011). In fact, we adopt as our starting 
point the Basel III requirement that banks’ ‘capital’ (the book value of equity in the banks’ balance 
sheet) should be equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets (loans to households and firms). To meet this 
requirement, banks in FALSTAFFS issue equities to households, which has the effect of shifting 
deposits to equity on the liability side of the balance sheet and increasing the ratio of capital to 
loans. To balance the balance sheet, banks purchase government bonds (conventionally deemed 
risk-free) which together with central bank reserves (also risk-free) provide for a certain proportion 
of ‘safe’ capital to balance against risky assets.    
 
The principal aim of the analysis is to identify the potential for a stationary state economy, even in 
the presence of debt-based money. In fact, it may be noted that the FALSTAFF economy is almost 
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entirely a credit money economy. No physical cash changes hands, and transactions are all deemed 
to be electronic transactions through the bank accounts of firms, household and government (and 
through the reserve account of the central bank). For the purposes of testing the role of credit 
creation in the growth imperative, this simplification is clearly robust. We have also incorporated 
conditions on commercial banks appropriate for the testing of the overall hypothesis that interest-
bearing debt leads to growth.  
 
The results of the analysis are discussed in detail in Jackson and Victor (2015a) where the authors 
present a variety of scenarios, the first of these demonstrates clearly the potential for a stationary 
state: in such a scenario (which was tested under a range of values for the interest rate on deposits, 
loans and government bonds) there are no changes in any of the real economy aggregates, net 
lending is zero across all sectors and there are no changes in the stocks of assets and liabilities.  
Though not particularly representative of an economy in the real world, this solution does however 
refute the ‘growth imperative’ hypothesis.   
 
Several sensitivity analyses were then carried out to test the robustness of this finding.  First, the 
authors introduced a random variation in consumer demand to test whether the stationary state 
was stable.   Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the results of this analysis. Although Figure 5 shows 
considerable variation in the short term growth rate (within a range of less than ±1%) it is clear that 
the long-run growth rate is still around zero. Certainly there is no obvious systematic expansion of 
the economy, even though the net lending positions of the different sectors (Figure 6) vary 
considerably over the run. Again, variations in deposit, loan, and bond rates, and in the capital 
adequacy requirement and the reserve ratio make no appreciable difference to this long-term trend, 
or indeed to the amplitude of the variations around it.   
 
We could describe the economy illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 as a quasi-stationary-state economy 
with a long-run average growth rate of zero. Notice that the sum of net lending, remains zero across 
the run, in spite of the variation in net lending in individual sectors. This is an indication that the 
model is working consistently, and reflecting correctly the accounting identities that must hold in 
any real economy. Though the pattern looks rather dramatic, notice that the amplitude of the 
variations in net lending is not high – less than 0.5% of the GDP in most cases.    
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Figure 5: Growth rate under random fluctuations in consumer demand (Scenario 2) 
 
 
Figure 6: Net lending under random fluctuations in consumer demand (Scenario 2) 
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Next, the authors tested the stability of the economy following a larger one-off shock to consumer 
demand.  Once again, (Figure 7, Scenario 3), the stationary state was stable, in the sense that the 
growth rate returned to zero over the long term, despite initial fluctuations in demand. Jackson and 
Victor (2015a) also tested two potential kinds of responses in the face of such a consumption shock.  
The first was the response of government; the second was the response of investors (firms).   
 
In the face of a decline in aggregate demand, governments tend to have lower tax receipts and 
potentially higher welfare costs, leading to a rising fiscal deficit with potentially higher borrowing 
costs in the future.  It is therefore not unusual for governments to respond to lower aggregate 
demand by reducing government spending.  Austerity policy (as it has come to be called) was one of 
the principal responses to the financial crisis of 2008/9 by western governments.  Paradoxically 
however, this response can significantly slow down recovery and as Jackson and Victor (2015a: 
Scenario 4) demonstrate, in the extreme case it can lead to a complete collapse in aggregate 
demand.  Keynesians have long argued that the appropriate response of government in the face of 
declining aggregate demand is to increase government spending.  FALSTAFFS can be used to model 
the implications of this kind of ‘counter-cyclical’ spending.  
 
A similar choice faces investors.  When expected output falls, the tendency is to reduce investment, 
this reduction in investment depresses output further.  However, it also acts to increase the rate of 
return on capital and hence to improve profitability.  Conversely, when expected output rises, there 
is a tendency to overinvest and this reduces the return on capital and the profitability of firms. The 
outcome of these combined processes is a business cycle, in which investment (and output) typically 
follow a pattern of waves whose amplitude depends on the strength of the response (the animal 
spirits) of investors to expected changes in final demand.  FALSTAFFS can simulate a change in animal 
spirits – the strength of the investor response to changes in expected demand – and hence explore 
the implications of different behaviour responses to a one-off shock.    
 
Figure 7 shows three scenarios taken from Jackson and Victor (2015a).  Scenario 3 illustrates changes 
in the growth rate following a one-off shock with default government response (no change in 
spending) and default investor response (no amplification of the accelerator coefficient in the 
investment function).  Scenario 5 shows how the amplitude of the after-shocks increases when there 
is an increase in animal spirits from investors. In fact, this scenario becomes unstable in the long run.  
Scenario 6 shows how these fluctuations can be tamed by a countercyclical spending strategy in 
which government spending is increased when demand growth falls below zero and decreases when 
demand growth rises above zero.  Scenario 4 (not shown here) is the collapse scenario, in which 
government imposes strict austerity.     
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Figure 7: The stabilising influence of countercyclical spending  
after a demand shock with increased ‘animal spirits’  
 
In summary, Jackson and Victor (2015a) had developed a variety of scenarios which exemplify quasi-
stationary states of various kinds, and which offered resilience from instability in the face of random 
fluctuations, demand shocks, and exaggerated ‘animal spirits’. None of the scenarios were sensitive 
to modest changes in the values for interest rates  on deposits, loans and government bonds.17
 
  
Perhaps most significantly, these conclusions are not changed by imposing demands on banks to 
maintain a given capital adequacy ratio or to hold a given ratio of central bank reserves to bank 
deposits.  The only scenario in which instability led to economic collapse was the one in which we 
imposed a ‘strict’ austerity policy in response to a negative shock to consumer demand. In this case, 
it was the austerity policy, rather than the existence of debt, that crashed the model. 
 
It is worth pointing out that, in spite of the findings here, there are a number of good arguments 
against private interest-bearing debt as the main means of creation (and destruction) of the money 
                                                          
17  A sensitivity analysis was conducted in FALSTAFF for values of the interest rate on loans between 0 and 15%, and 
on bonds and deposits between 0 and 10%. Slight increases in the amplitude of oscillations was observed at 
higher interest rates, under conditions of shock. But the conclusions observed in this paper still held.     
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supply. As a wide variety of authors have pointed out,18
 
 this form of money can lead to 
unsustainable levels of public and private debt, increased price and fiscal instability, speculative 
behaviour in relation to environmental resources, greater inequality in incomes and in wealth, and a 
loss of sovereign control of the money system. We are therefore firmly of the opinion that monetary 
reform is an essential component of a sustainable economy. We regard the current study as an 
important way of distinguishing where effort should be placed in transforming this system. 
Specifically, the results in this paper suggest that it is not necessary to eliminate interest-bearing 
debt per se, if the goal is to achieve a resilient, stationary or quasi-stationary state of the economy.  
It is also worth reiterating that, aside from the question of interest-bearing money, there exists a 
number of other incentives towards growth within the architecture of the capitalist economy. We 
have elucidated some of these incentives elsewhere (Jackson 2009, Victor 2008, Jackson and Victor 
2011). They must be taken to include, for instance: profit maximisation (and in particular the pursuit 
of labour productivity growth) by firms, asset price speculation and consumer aspirations for 
increased income and wealth. Some of these mechanisms also lead to potential instabilities in the 
capitalist economy. Many of them are reliant on the existence of credit-based money systems. 
Minsky (1994), perhaps most famously, has shown how cycles of investment and speculation, built 
around debt-based money, can lead to endemic instability. But this logic does not entail that 
interest-bearing money, in and of itself, creates a growth imperative.  
 
 
  
                                                          
18  Useful critiques of debt-based money can be found in Sigurjónsson 2015, Daly 2014, Wolf 2014, Farley et al 2013, 
Jackson and Dyson 2012, Huber and Robertson 2000, as well as the ground-breaking, early work from Douthwaite 
(1990). The idea of eliminating banks’ ability to create money can be traced to Frederick Soddy (1931); for a 
useful historical overview see Dittmer 2015.  
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6 FALSTAFF Part 2: Green Investment and Portfolio Allocation 
In addition to the work described in Section 5, the FALSTAFF framework has been used to illustrate 
the importance of assessing both real and financial aspects of the transition to a low-carbon 
economy.  Illustrative results from an expanded version of the model were presented at a workshop 
co-convened by UNEP and the Centre for International Governance Innovation  and subsequently 
published as a working paper by the UNEP Finance Initiative (Jackson and Victor 2015b).   
 
One of the aims of the UNEP FI paper was to explore the implications of introducing a substantial 
programme of green investment on the economy.  Green investment is defined for these purposes 
as investment which will reduce the environmental impact of economic activities and includes for 
instance, investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, resource productivity, forestation, 
ecosystem restoration and so on.  Our aim was to examine both the potential impacts of such 
investment on the main economic aggregates (demand, supply, employment etc) and also on the 
financial flows and balance sheets.   
 
The Waterloo version of FALSTAFF – denoted here as FALSTAFFW for ease of reference -  included 
several additions and variations to the model described in the previous section. These comprised: an 
econometrically estimated investment function, an econometrically estimated portfolio allocation 
model to describe households savings behaviour, an additional sector to account for  trade (and 
capital transactions) with the rest of the world, and an expanded balance sheet including debt, 
equity, bonds, housing, mortgages, loans and pension funds.   
 
In this section we provide an overview of the structure of the expanded FALSTAFFW model and 
present some of the illustrative results presented at the Waterloo meeting.   
 
Households make three kinds of decisions in FALSTAFFW. First they decide how much to spend and 
how much to save. Second, they decide how much to invest in fixed capital assets (housing). Finally 
they decide how to allocate savings/borrowing to different asset classes. In relation to the first 
decision, the model allows the user to choose between a simple savings ratio based on a proportion 
of disposable income, or a more sophisticated consumption function of the form favoured by post-
Keynesian SFC theorists, in which household consumption C is given by a function of the form:  
 
    𝐶𝐶 =  𝛼𝛼1𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝  +  𝛼𝛼2𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊ℎ    6) 
 
where Ydisp is the disposable income of households and NWh is their net worth. This form of 
consumption function thus incorporates both propensities to consume from disposable income and 
also propensities to consume from household wealth (as does the model in Section 5). In the long 
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run this dependency of consumption on household wealth provides a link between behaviour in the 
real economy and the health of the financial economy (Godley and Lavoie, 2007), although it should 
be noted that these feedbacks are much slower than those provided via stock-market signals on 
consumer confidence, for instance. Values for α1 and α2 were estimated using quarterly national 
accounts data between 1991 and 2013, published by for Canada by Statistics Canada and for the UK 
by the Office for National Statistics.19
 
  
Housing investment in FALSTAFFW is driven partly by population growth,20
These savings decisions are a key element in the establishment of SFC monetary flows and are 
modelled in FALSTAFFW using an econometrically estimated Portfolio Allocation Module based on a 
framework originally developed for this purpose by Brainard and Tobin (1968). The approach was 
later adopted (and adapted) by Godley and Lavoie (2007) as a key element within a post-Keynesian 
SFC approach.  
 and partly by an 
exogenously defined housing growth parameter to reflect changes in household size and 
composition.   The price of housing is determined by the balance between supply of housing 
(investment) and the desire for housing, which flows from households savings decision.  
 
The broad thrust of the approach is to suppose that the desired holdings of a particular asset depend 
both on the rate of return on that asset and also on the rates of return (or interest rates) on other 
assets (or liabilities). So for example, if the rate of return on equities rises (or is expected to rise), 
households tend to allocate more of their savings to equities than, say, government bonds. 
Conversely if the return on equity falls (or is expected to fall), households would tend to sell equities 
in favour of some other asset. There are several distinct ways of representing this kind of allocation 
process. For example, one can proceed (see Godley and Lavoie 2007) by determining for each asset 
Ai a target proportion of household net worth, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 , occupied by that asset, given by:  
 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 = 𝜆𝜆0𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊    7) 
 
where the rj are the rates of return (or interest) on the various assets (or liabilities) and the λij are 
constant coefficients, to be derived from a (constrained) econometric analysis of past trends.21
In this version of FALSTAFF, we estimate these target proportions using data for seven distinct 
asset/liability classes: deposits, bonds, equities, housing wealth, mortgages, loans and pensions.  
   
                                                          
19  The StatCan database (http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/) is one of the most user-friendly national accounts 
databases of any country in the world and one of the reasons we decided to calibrate FALSTAFF first against 
Canadian data.  
20  We assume an exogenously variable 0.5% annual growth rate for population.  
21  In order for this procedure to work correctly, it should be noted that liabilities (mortgages and loans) must be 
counted in a negative sense within the framework. 
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When we estimated these relationships using the econometric software Eviews and quarterly 
financial accounts data for Canada and the UK from 1991 to 2013, we found a high degree of 
dependency on 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇(−1), the first lag of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 . In other words, it seems as though households’ portfolio 
allocations are relatively “sticky” on aggregate. To improve the estimation we made two changes to 
equation 6). The first was to use Yd directly rather than the ratio Yd/NW as a dependent variable on 
the right hand side of the equation. The second was to include the lagged variable 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(−1) – the 
actual value of asset Ai as a proportion of net worth in the previous period – as an additional 
dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation.22
 
 The econometric estimation of the 
target proportion for each asset and liability in FALSTAFFW is therefore given by:  
   𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 = 𝜆𝜆0𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(−1)  8) 
 
 
Figure 8: Estimated and actual holdings of equities by Canadian households, 1991-2013 
Source: output from the Portfolio Allocation Module in FALSTAFFW. 
 
The model in this form was reasonably successful in replicating historical trends in the holdings of 
different asset types. Figure 8 illustrates for example the estimated and actual holdings of equities 
by households in Canada between 1991 and 2013. In particular it is to be noted that the model 
                                                          
22  This is similar but a little less constrained than estimating the differenced variable 𝛥𝛥𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇on the left hand side of 6).  
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successfully predicts both the impact of the financial crisis on equity holdings and also the 
subsequent recovery as well as the results of the earlier dot.com bubble and subsequent market fall. 
This is an important validation of the model’s ability to reflect financial stability and instability – a 
core goal of our approach.  
 
The firms sector in FALSTAFFW simulates the production of all goods and services in the economy, 
including those accounted for by public spending.23
 
 Nominal demand in the economy represents 
firms’ income. The labour employment LE required to meet this demand is calculated using a time-
varying labour productivity function LP which varies over time according to an econometrically 
estimated real labour productivity growth rate, lpg according to: 
    𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 =  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃0(1 + 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡−2012     9a) 
    𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 =  𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑝𝑝 .𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃      9b) 
 
where p is price and GDPnom is the nominal demand. It should be clear that nominal demand cannot 
always be met by domestic production, particularly given that labour is constrained by the available 
labour force which therefore determines a supply constraint on the domestic economy.  
 
Firms’ costs include taxes on production and on products (determined in the government sector), 
interest payments on loans, and wages. The wage bill is calculated via a time-varying wage rate WR 
which also determines price in the model. Two factors are deemed to change the wage rate in the 
model. Initially we assume that labour productivity improvements are passed on to workers, so that 
the unadjusted wage rate WR is given by:  
 
𝑊𝑊𝛥𝛥 =  𝑊𝑊𝛥𝛥0(1 + 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔)𝑡𝑡−2012    10) 
 
An inflation adjusted wage rate WR’ is then estimated by using a simplified Phillips curve that 
inflates the wage rate when unemployment is low and deflates it when unemployment is high.24
 
 The 
price of domestically produced goods in the model is determined by the ratio of the inflation 
adjusted wage rate WR’ to the unadjusted wage rate WR.  
Firms have to make three other kinds of decisions in FALSTAFFW: how much of their net profits F to 
distribute as dividends; how much to invest in production; and how to finance this investment. The 
                                                          
23  Though something of a simplification of the structure of a real economy, this is also the way in which public 
spending is accounted for in the national accounts.  
24  Our Phillips curve is similar to the one used by Keen (2011) with a flat section around normal employment rates, a 
rising adjustment for low unemployment, a declining (but flatter) line for medium unemployment and a flat 
downwards adjustment of the wage for high unemployment.  
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dividend distribution FD can be decided either via an exogenously determined “retained earnings 
ratio” or else through an equation of the form: 
  
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 =  𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷(−1) +  𝜂𝜂𝐹𝐹(−1)   11) 
 
where F(-1) denotes profits in the previous period (i.e. the first lag of profits) and η is an 
econometrically estimated coefficient.  
 
The investment decision is determined in two parts. One of our intentions in the model is to be able 
to understand the implications of green investment on the performance of the economy. We 
therefore separate firms’ investment into a conventional component, predicted econometrically in 
the model and a green component which is determined exogenously. For the conventional 
component, we use an investment function proposed by Lavoie and Godley (2001). Firms’ 
investment I is estimated with a rate g of accumulation of physical capital K which is deemed to be 
dependent on the rate of cash flow rcf (calculated from the ratio of retained earnings to capital), the 
rate of interest rLf on firms loans (moderated by a leverage ratio, l), Tobin’s q ratio25
   𝑔𝑔 =  𝛾𝛾1𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑞𝑞 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶    12) 
 and the rate rCU 
of capacity utilisation:  
 
Broadly speaking, this function means that conventional investment is expected to increase with 
increasing cash flow, to decline with increasing interest rates, to rise as Tobin’s q rises (because the 
value of equity is high in relation to physical capital), and to increase with the capacity utilisation 
rate. This last factor reflects the impact of rising demand on investment. As demand rises, spare 
capacity diminishes, encouraging new investment. Conventional investment is then given by:  
 
     𝐼𝐼 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓(−1)     13) 
 
Where Kf(-1) is the lag of firms’ productive physical capital stock Kf.  
 
Although the investment in productive capital stock is endogenous in FALSTAFFW, green investment 
is determined exogenously. It is assumed first that over the course of the run, a rising proportion of 
GDP (starting from zero) will be allocated to green investment. The user decides on the final target 
proportion and also selects the sectors in which this investment is made (firms, housing, 
government). The model then calculates the green investment in each sector over each year of the 
run assuming the same proportions of green investment in each sector as predicted for conventional 
                                                          
25  Tobin’s q (first proposed by Nobel Laureate James Tobin) is a parameter that measures the ratio of the value of 
equity to the value of the capital stock. 
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investment. The impact on the economy of this green investment depends on two further 
parameters. The first is the extent to which it is deemed to be additional to or simply to substitute 
for predicted investment. The second is the extent to which both additional and nonadditional green 
investments are productive – in the sense that they add to the productive stock of the economy.26
 
  
Both of these parameters can be selected by the user. The default position assumes that green 
investments will be non-additional, so that there will be a gradual shift away from “brown 
investment” towards green investment within the same investment architecture predicted by the 
model. It should be noted that productive additional investment adds to the productive capacity of 
the economy, whereas non-productive, non-additional investments subtract from the productive 
capacity of the economy. Non-productive, additional investments add to nominal demand in the 
economy, but do not change the productive capital stock. The model accounts separately for non-
productive capital stocks.  
 
The financial and monetary importance of this distinction concerns the supply constraints on 
domestic production of goods and services. Just as supply is sometimes constrained by available 
labour, it may also be constrained by available capital. We assume here a constant capital output 
ratio (calibrated against historical data) to determine a further limit on maximum real (and hence 
nominal) demand supplied by the domestic economy. The overall limit on GDP is then the minimum 
of the maxima determined through labour and through capital constraints.  Once supply constraints 
are reached, additional nominal demand created by the exogenous investment strategy can only be 
met in two ways: first by increasing imported final demand from the overseas sector; or in the 
absence of this possibility by an increase in prices.  Both avenues would tend to depress real GDP 
growth.    
 
The final decision to be made by firms is how to finance the overall investment needs (including both 
conventional and green investments). In FALSTAFF, firms investments can be funded through 
retained earnings (profits minus dividends), through issuing new equities and through taking out 
new bank loans. Once firms’ retained earnings are exhausted we assume that additional financing 
                                                          
26  We use the term ‘productive’ here in the rather conventional sense that an increase in the productive capital stock 
from productive investment increases the capacity of the economy to produce goods and services which have 
market prices and which can be sold at a profit. An increase in ‘unproductive capital’ from ‘unproductive 
investment’ generates environmental benefits for which there is no market price and so the unproductive 
investment is undertaken at a net financial cost. This latter is however clearly critical in maintaining the 
sustainability and (ultimately) the productive capacity of the economy.  
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needs are met through a mixture of loans and equities according to an exogenously variable debt to 
equity ratio, which is moderated to some (variable) degree by the rate of interest on firms’ loans.27
 
  
The banks sector in FALSTAFF is a simplified accounting sector with two main functions. Its profit and 
loss account simply collates the interest payments on loans (including household mortgages) and 
pays out the interest due on deposits. Gross profits are the difference between these two.28
 
 Banks 
pay taxes to the government on these earnings and net profits are divided between retained 
earnings and dividends. Banks’ dividends are calculated as a residual. Retained earnings decisions 
depend on the financing requirements of banks, which are in their turn depend on what is 
happening in the capital account. This is the second function allocated to banks in FALSTAFF and 
relates to the provision of capital facilities (deposits and loans) for other sectors.  
There are two main capital account decisions to be made by banks. The first is how much money to 
hold as reserves with the central bank. For the purposes of this version of the model, this is allocated 
through an exogenously variable reserve ratio, with a default value in which reserves constitute 1% 
of deposits held with the bank. The second decision involves banks capital adequacy requirements. 
Basel III requires banks to hold a minimum of 8% of their risk-adjusted capital in the form of risk-free 
capital. We interpret this requirement to mean that the sum of banks reserves plus their holdings of 
sovereign bonds must be 8% of their total private sector lending.29
 
 This capital adequacy 
requirement then determines banks need for government bonds, and also (in conjunction with the 
changes in deposits and lending) determines their need for retained earnings. Specifically, the 
transaction matrix reveals that banks’ undistributed profits FUf are given by: 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 =  𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 + 𝛥𝛥𝑃𝑃 − 𝛥𝛥𝐿𝐿 − 𝛥𝛥𝑀𝑀 − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 − 𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵    14) 
 
Where D represents deposits, P is pensions, L is loans to households and firms, M is mortgages 
against property purchases, R is central bank reserves and B is government bonds. In the event that 
this funding requirement exceeds total net profits, banks can also meet their funding requirement 
by taking out loans (advances) from the central bank.  
 
The government sector in FALSTAFFW allows for a variety of government spending strategies and sets 
the tax rates on household income, firms’ income and (indirectly) on products. Spending decisions 
                                                          
27  Currently this moderation of the debt to equity ratio is determined by a small exogenously set adjustment to the 
debt to equity preference. In future developments we will look for ways to endogenize the debt to equity ratio 
further to depend on market conditions.  
28  We do not, for instance, include banks wages in the banking sector. They are assumed to be accounted for via the 
firms sector.  
29  Sovereign bonds are typically rated at zero risk. The historical data support a close to 8% capital adequacy ratio in 
Canada. This rate can be varied in the model.  
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by the government can be determined in three separate Modes in the model. In Mode 1, a simple 
exogenously varied growth rate is applied to both consumption spending and investment spending. 
The default value in the base run (described in more detail in the next section) is 2% per annum. In 
Mode 2, the government can operate a balanced budget policy in which spending is strictly 
constrained by tax receipts. Finally, in Mode 3, it can operate a counter-cyclical adjustment to the 
exogenous growth rate in which government spending rises (by up to 20%) if unemployment is high 
and falls (by up to the same amount) when unemployment is low. In each of these modes, it is also 
assumed that governments will tend to reduce deficits (or surpluses) through adjustments to both 
spending and the tax rates, when the debt to GDP ratio rises above (or falls below) certain levels. 
  
Government borrowing is funded through the issuance of bonds which are conceptualised in 
FALSTAFFW as simple loans with an endogenously varying interest rate. Three other sectors create an 
endogenous demand for loans. Households purchase bonds in response to their asset allocation 
preferences (equation 4) above). Banks hold bonds in order to meet their capital adequacy 
requirements. Central banks hold bonds (see below) in exchange for liquidity provided to 
commercial banks in the form of reserves. The gap between the supply of bonds (government 
borrowing) and the demand for bonds is assumed to be met by bond purchases/sales from the 
foreign sector.30
 
  
The central bank sets interest rates in FALSTAFFW, by lowering the base rate31 when unemployment 
is high and raising it when unemployment is low. Rates on other assets or liabilities (deposits, 
household loans, mortgages on property, firms’ loans, central bank advances and reserves) are set 
by historically calibrated interest rate spreads around the base rate.32
 
 Aside from this monetary 
policy function, the central bank’s only other interactions are with the commercial bank sector, 
providing additional liquidity for the commercial banks by exchanging government bonds for central 
bank reserves and providing a lender of last resort function through advances when required.  
In contrast to the closed economies described in Sections 4 and 5, FALSTAFFW introduces a foreign 
sector to account for the balance of trade between the domestic economy and the rest of the world. 
The import sector can be configured in two different ways. In the “balanced trade” mode the 
economy is assumed to aim in the short term for a balanced trade position in which imports are 
more or less equal to exports. In the second mode, the trade position can float, allowing the 
overseas sector to supply the balance between nominal domestic demand and the (capital and 
                                                          
30  A more sophisticated endogenization of the price of bonds through capital gains/losses (ie changes in bond yields) 
is under development.  
31  The rate at which commercial banks can borrow from the central bank.  
32  It is also possible to “turn off” the endogenously calculated interest rates in FALSTAFF. In this mode, the model 
simply uses the historical base year data.  
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labour constrained) capacity of the domestic economy. This supply balance includes provision for a 
given target unemployment rate. Once unemployment in the domestic economy meets this target, it 
is assumed that additional supply capacity is provided by the overseas sector. This device is 
somewhat simplistic but serves for the moment both to maintain the supply demand balance in the 
model and also to stabilise the unemployment rate.  
 
Aside from the nominal net import balance, the current account of the foreign sector includes only 
interest receipts (from bonds and deposits) and interest payments (for loans). The net lending of the 
overseas sector is then allocated in two separate ways, through bonds purchased from or sold back 
to the domestic economy government, and loans taken out from or deposits paid into domestic 
economy banks. Bond purchases are assumed to take up the slack between the domestic demand 
for bonds and the borrowing requirement of the domestic government. The remaining transactions 
(in either loans or deposits) are determined by the accounting requirement of the transaction flows 
matrix. In other words, any bond purchases must be paid for either from the net lending of the 
foreign current account sector or from loans taking out from domestic sector banks. 
 
Finally, FALSTAFFW incorporates an environmental burden sector which uses simple intensity 
coefficients and reduction targets to model the impact of exogenously determined investment 
strategies. Green investment (see above) acts to reduce the environmental burden index (EBI) which 
measures the overall environmental burden of the economy.  The EBI was loosely calibrated to 
respond to the investment needs associated with meeting aggressive domestic greenhouse gas 
reduction targets.  
 
The broad aim of the FALSTAFFW was to illustrate the need to integrate financial and monetary 
understanding into any exploration of the potential for green or sustainable investment. Financing 
the transition to a low carbon economy, for instance, cannot simply be a question of quantifying an 
investment need and then assuming that this quantum has no appreciable impact on financial or 
monetary stability. A core element within the work was therefore to demonstrate the capability of 
SFC modelling to inform questions about the structure (and long-term viability) of sustainable 
investment.  Three, highly illustrative scenarios were discussed at the Waterloo meeting.   
 
• A “Base Run” scenario assumed growth in government spending at a rate approximately 
equal to the desired growth rate, a liberal position in relation to overseas trade which did 
not seek to constrain the balance of payments, and investment driven only by the 
econometric investment function, with no specific role for green investment; 
• A “Balanced Trade” scenario assumed the same parameters as the BAU usual scenario but 
sought in addition to achieve a position in which exports and imports were balanced; 
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• A “Green Transformation” scenario sought to explore the implications of very substantial 
increases in green investment over the lifetime of the scenario while allowing for a balanced 
trade position to be achieved; in support of these aims the Green Transformation scenario 
allowed for a policy of countercyclical spending by the government; and a shift to services, 
characterised as decline in labour productivity growth over the run.  
 
Not surprisingly, since it is the only scenario with substantive green investment, only the Green 
Transformation showed a decline in the Environmental Burden Index (Figure 18 in Jackson and Victor 
2015b). More interesting were a variety of indications in relation to monetary and financial aspects 
of the economy from the three scenarios.  Amongst a number of tentative findings were the 
following:  
 
• Although the Base Run achieved a consistent growth path over the scenario period, it did so 
at the expense of several undesirable features of the financial economy, including: a rising 
debt to GDP ratio; an increasing fragile position in relation to the household sector balance 
sheet, including the near collapse of pension provisions by the end of the run and an 
extended asset bubble in the housing market, with highly leveraged positions in the 
mortgage market; and a rising balance of payments deficit over the later years of the 
scenario (cf Figures 4-8 in Jackson and Victor 2015b);  
• Under the Balanced Trade scenario several of these undesirable features were substantially 
improved: the balance of payments problem (not surprisingly) practically disappeared, the 
collapse in pensions was stabilised, and the housing bubble and overleveraging of the 
household sector was greatly reduced; 
• Conversely, these gains were achieved at the cost of considerably lower growth, higher 
unemployment, and an increased debt to GDP ratio; 
• The Green Transformation scenario was the only scenario which delivered a substantial 
reduction in the EBI (Figure 9); it also ultimately reduced unemployment below the levels in 
the Base Run; but these gains were achieved at the cost of rising inflation and a decline in 
the real growth rate to zero by the end of the run; though the debt to GDP ratio was also 
high in this scenario, the real debt servicing costs declined below the base run by the end of 
the scenario as a result of higher inflation;  
• The flexibility of the government to engage in countercyclical spending plays an important 
role in stabilising the decline in the growth rate; attempts to impose ‘austerity’ when real 
growth declines lead to potential collapse states.    
 
These findings are subject to a number of caveats and limitations, including of course the particular 
assumptions made about behaviour within different financial sectors.  For instance, FALSTAFFW deos 
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not endogenise  dynamic market responses, such as the response of financial markets to the degree 
of leverage of the household sector.  Consequently, the financial and political fragility of each 
scenario can only really be assessed by inspection of the underlying balance sheets. In reality, such 
fragility would likely create financial instability long before the model revealed problems in the 
macroeconomic aggregates.     
 
Nonetheless, the work reported in Jackson and Victor 2015b has several important merits. First of 
all, it highlights the importance of incorporating financial and monetary analysis into a 
macroeconomic model of green investment.  Secondly, it illustrates the feasibility of achieving a 
stock-flow consistent description of the macroeconomy, with a consistent set of transaction flow 
matrices and financial balances across each sector and the economy as a whole.  Finally, it illustrates 
the kinds of trade-offs that might be anticipated, when a substantial proportion of national income is 
redirected towards a different form of investment.  In the particular circumstances explored here, 
FALSTAFFW has revealed potentially inflationary effects from a large-scale transition to green 
investment while still maintaining full employment.  
 
 
Figure 9: Illustrative trends in ‘Environmental Burden Index’ 
1 = Base run; 2 = Balanced Trade; 3 = Green Transformation 
Source: Jackson and Victor 2015b (Fig 18) 
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7 ECOGRO: An integrated approach to growth, inequality and the  
environment  
The previous sections have described three separate applications of SFC modelling carried out at the 
University of Surrey in collaboration with York University in Canada. A parallel development, broadly 
using the same post-Keynesian SFC framework, was carried out at the University of Vienna. The 
ECOGRO model is a multi-sector macro model in a stock-flow consistent (SFC) demand driven 
framework.  There are a number of differences between the ECOGRO model and the SIGMA and 
FALSTAFF models developed in Surrey.  
In the first place, SIGMA and FALSTAFF are both calibrated at the level of the national economy; 
ECOGRO is calibrated for the EU as a whole. Secondly, ECOGRO separates out the energy sector from 
within the firms sector in order to explore the implications of changing the energy mix. Thirdly, 
ECOGRO explores the impact of including an environmental damage function on the output of the 
economy. Finally, the financial structure of ECOGRO is somewhat simplified by comparison with 
SIGMA and FALSTAFF with a slightly less complex balance sheet and fewer specific representations 
of financial behaviour.33
Figure 10 below summarises the overall structure of the ECOGRO model which consists of a five-
sector real economy comprising households, firms, banks, central bank and government and an 
additional ‘environment’ sector which provides resource inputs and receives environmental 
emissions. This innovation allows ECOGRO to integrate supply side environmental constraints 
(Kronenberg 2010; Fontana and Sawyer 2013) to deal with production led emissions in the EU. 
  
The firms sector in ECOGRO is taken as a macro institution that produces both capital and 
consumption goods demanded within the economy. The production process requires three key 
inputs – labor, capital and energy. While labor is provided by households and capital stock formation 
is supported through loans from banks, energy is produced by the sector itself. Total energy supply is 
determined by total expected output which is given as a mix of non-renewable and renewable 
energy. This creates a vertical linkage across two producer types within a sector creating a supply-
chain that allows for inter-sectoral feed backs through demand and price changes. 
As indicated above, the household sector is divided between capitalists (who in ECOGRO are the sole 
owners of both production sector and banks) and workers (who supply labour to firms and earn 
wages from them).  The household sector as a whole earns income either through firms’ profits or 
                                                          
33  The work in this section is described in more detail in a WWWforEurope working paper available online: 
http://www.foreurope.eu/fileadmin/documents/pdf/PolicyPapers/WWWforEurope_Policy_Paper_018.
pdf.   
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through wages. Household income is used for consumption which in turn generates demand and 
subsequently production decisions. This in turn determines employment levels of worker 
households.  
The banking sector in ECOGRO is modeled as simple intermediary between the households and the 
firm sector. Banks hold household deposits and give out loans to firms. If deposits are insufficient to 
meet loan demand, the banks can take cash advances from the central bank. Profits earned by the 
banks are redistributed directly to capitalist households. 
The government plays the role of maintaining public investment and supporting unemployed. In 
order to finance this expenditure, the government raises revenue through taxes on both the firms 
and the households. If expenditures exceed revenues, the government issues bonds which are 
purchased by the central bank.34
 
 
Figure 10: Overall structure of the ECOGRO model 
Central Bank: The central bank functions as the financial arm of the government where it controls 
money supply and buys and sells government bonds as required. Like the Banks sector, the Central  
                                                          
34  This structural simplification is in fact prevented by the Maastricht Treaty which allows central banks 
only to hold bonds purchased on the secondary market.  But for the purposes of the scenario 
exploration in ECOGRO this is not decisive.  
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Bank is model as a passive agent which allows for monetary transfers between the private and the 
public sectors of the economy. 
These five sectors interact with each other to form the real side of the ECOGRO economy in a closed 
demand-driven framework. Table 3 shows the balance sheet of the economy in terms of assets and 
liabilities and subsequently the net worth of the economy. 
  Households Production Financial 
Govt. ∑   Workers Capitalists Firms Energy Banks Central Bank 
Capital 
stock 
  
 + K  + KX  
   
 + K 
Inventories    + IN  + INX     + INV 
Bank 
Deposits  + D
h  + Dk    − Db   0 
Advances      + Ab  − A  0 
Bills       + BCB  − B 0 
Loans 
  
 − Lf  − LX   + L 
  
0 
∑  + Vh  + Vk  + Vf  + VX 0 0  − VG  + NV 
Table 3: Ecogro Balance Sheet  
Households’ net worth is defined in terms of deposits while firms value is determined by capital 
stock and inventories minus loans. The government sector is assumed to have a negative net worth, 
while the banking sector and the central bank have a net worth of zero with perfectly balanced 
assets and liabilities. 
To integrate the real economy with physical material flows, a sixth agent, the environment, is added 
to the model. The environment is modeled as an independent sector that interacts with the 
economy through two different channels. First, it provides a non-renewable raw material for energy 
production. Second, it accumulates Greenhouse Gasses (GHGs) through the production process. This 
interaction between the real and the environmental sector allows for studying issues of growth, 
distributions and climate change in a well-integrated single economic framework. For example, 
higher consumption levels result in a higher use of resources for output production. This in turn 
increases both demand for labor and energy which can have secondary multiplier impacts on the 
economy. Without fully understanding how these changes feedback and stabilize across the whole 
economic system, it is hard to justify the role of economic policy in the long-run. Another advantage 
of this framework lies in addressing the distributional impact of different polices especially on inter-
household income and consumption distributions. While certain policies might not result in a change 
Milestone 40 – Final version March 2016 
 
 
 
46 | P a g e  
 
 
 
in aggregate demand, they might have a non-trivial impact the worker and capitalist income and 
consumption distributions.  
Five policy scenarios have been evaluated so far in ECOGRO (Naqvi 2015);  
 LowCons: Reduction in consumption levels to reduce emission levels following the „limits-
to-growth“ hypothesis (Jackson 2009).  
 DmgFunc: Damage to capital stock is proportional to the level of emissions and thus requires 
higher investment levels to maintain production capacity (Nordhaus 2011, Rezai et al 2012, 
Taylor and Foley 2014). Capital stock depreciation rate is endogenized to the level of 
emissions. 
 HiRenew: High share of more expensive renewable energy in the economy to reduce 
emissions (Tahvonen and Salo 2001). Renewable energy is assumed to be more capital 
intensive and more expensive than non-renewable energy. Thus in order to shift to a higher 
renewable energy sector, significant investment decisions need to be made to allow for a 
low carbon transition. This experiment looks at the indirect consequences of this transition 
process. 
 Carbon taxes (TaxF, TaxH): Firms and households pay carbon taxes which are endogenously 
related to the level of emissions (Marron and Toder 2014). A carbon tax is usually proposed 
as an instrument to curb emissions. The debate is divided on whether it should be on firms 
(creator of jobs) or households (consumers of output). This experiment looks at the 
implications of both taxes across the economy. A deviation in the level of emissions from a 
benchmark level progressively raises taxes on either firms (TaxF) or household (TaxH). An 
environment tax on firms results in an increase in prices through the markup, resulting in 
short-run profit gains for the capitalists. As a result a decline in real income of workers is off-
set by the increases in demand from the capitalists through short-run profits.35
 Technological innovation; (InnoK, InnoE): On the one hand, technological innovation has 
resulted in relative decoupling across high income countries (Jackson 2009). On the other 
hand, innovation implies low production costs, which can result in higher consumption 
levels. In order to assess the impact of this “rebound effect”, the model looks at two 
exogenous technological parameters; technological improvement in capital required per unit 
of output and energy required per unit of output (Herring and Roy 2007).  
 
                                                          
35  The result of this is an adjustment in demand from workers to capitalists (worsening of income 
inequality) for the BAU level of output. For the household tax, both workers and capitalists face an 
equal reduction in demand by lowering disposable income. The net result of this is low output which 
does not affect income inequality 
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A number of model output variables are measured against a Business-as-Usual (BAU) benchmark 
across the seven scenarios defined above. These variables include: real output;  unemployment; 
inequality (ratio of capitalist to worker incomes); and environmental sustainability (greenhouse gas 
emissions) and compared with a Business-as-Usual (BAU) benchmark scenario. Figures 11-14 show 
the simulation results for these four key indicators. 
The results show that neither the link between output and income distribution, nor the link between 
output and the environment is predetermined. In particular, while the connection between output 
and unemployment conforms to the standard formulation of Okun’s law, the income level and the 
functional income distribution are not as clear-cut. Similar macro level outcomes can be the result of 
very different underlying structural and distributional changes. Regarding environmental aspects, 
the absolute decoupling of energy use and emissions from output can be observed in this model in 
some cases. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Real output relative to BAU Scenario 
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Figure 12: Unemployment in ECOGRO relative to BAU scenario 
 
 
Figure 13: GHG emissions in ECOGRO relative to BAU scenario  
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Figure 14: Income inequality in ECOGRO relative to BAU scenario 
 
Four policies show different trade-offs between growth, inequality and environment. The de-growth 
(LowCons) simulation shows that the lower output leads to higher unemployment while at the same 
time reducing inequality in the functional income distribution.36
Three policies, however, appear to offer triple-win characteristics. Increasing the share of renewable 
energy (HiRenew) reduces emissions while leaving all other outcome variables virtually unchanged. 
Finally, innovations in capital (InnoK) or in energy (InnoE) productivity reduce both energy use and 
emissions, while at the same time raising real incomes and redistributing towards workers. 
 If emissions feed back into the 
depreciation of the capital stock as in the damage function experiment (DmgFunc), this has the 
opposite effect: unemployment falls but the functional income distribution worsens for workers. At 
the same time, this is the only policy which leads to higher emissions due to increased investment 
requirements. Environmental taxes on households (TaxH) or firms (TaxF) have mainly distributive 
effects while leaving output and emissions largely unchanged. 
 
 
                                                          
36  It should be noted that, in contrast to scenarios in Sections 4-6, no variations in labour productivity 
growth or working hours are explored in this section.  Hence the relationship between output and 
employment is clearly coupled.   
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The model presented here can be extended to test for additional climate-related policies while 
keeping track of the feedback effects. These, for example, can include consumption based emissions 
through imports, endogenous growth, endogenous technical change, endogenous pro- (austerity) or 
counter-cyclical (stimulus) government spending. Other key areas include the inclusion of aspects of 
financialisation that indirectly feedback into the real economy and subsequently impact the 
environment. 
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8  Discussion and Conclusions 
Modern western economies (in the Eurozone and elsewhere) face a number of challenges over the 
coming decades.  Achieving full employment, meeting climate change and other environmental 
targets and reducing inequality rank amongst the highest of these.  The conventional route to 
achieving full employment and reducing inequality has been to pursue economic growth. But this 
route has created two critical problems for modern economies. The first of these is the coupling 
between output and environmental impact. The second is the fragility in financial balances that has 
accompanied relentless demand expansion.  
The prevailing global response to the coupling between output and emissions has been to encourage 
decoupling through investing in green technologies (green growth).  But this response runs the risk 
of exacerbating problems associated with the over-leveraging of households, firms and 
governments. An alternative approach is to reduce the pace of growth and to restructure economies 
around green services (post-growth).37
The analyses in this paper have been motivated by the need to address these fundamental dilemmas 
and to inform the debate that has emerged in recent years about the relative merits of green growth 
and post-growth scenarios.  In pursuit of this aim we have developed a suite of macroeconomic 
models based on the methodology of Post-Keynesian Stock Flow Consistent (SFC) system dynamics.  
Aggregate demand was calibrated at the level of the national economy (UK, Canada) in three of the 
models and at the level of the EU as a whole in the fourth.  Applications of the modelling framework 
have included: 
 But the potential dangers of declining growth rates lie in 
increased inequality and in rising unemployment. Some more fundamental arguments have also 
been made against the feasibility of interest-bearing debt within a post-growth economy.   
• Explorations of income inequality (SIGMA, ECOGRO)  
• Understandings of the ‘growth imperative’ (FALSTAFFS) 
• Assessments of employment and unemployment (SIGMA, FALSTAFFW, ECOGRO) 
• Examinations of the effect of trade balances and imbalances (FALSTAFFW) 
• Elaboration of financial balances and imbalances (FALSTAFFS, FALSTAFFW)  
• Illustration of green investment scenarios (FALSTAFFW, ECOGRO) 
• Exploration of trade-offs between policy goals (FALSTAFFW, ECOGRO) 
Our conclusions at this stage are necessarily preliminary, but it is possible to identify a number of 
important findings. We group these findings into several ‘blocks’ relating to the key challenges 
defined above: 
                                                          
37  It is worth pointing out that western economies may find themselves confronted with declining 
growth rates perforce, irrespective of other goals, as a result of ‘secular stagnation’. 
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The role of green investment 
• substantial green investment is vital to both a green growth and a post-growth world; 
• finding ways to finance green investment without destabilizing financial balance sheets or 
over-leveraging specific sectors is critical; 
• a key (unresolved) question in the debate is the extent to which green investment does or 
does not contribute to the productive capacity of the economy as conventionally measured;  
• depending on the answer to this question, substantial green investment faces potential 
complexities in terms of sector imbalances, balance sheet fragility and inflationary prices; 
• macroeconomic policy that fails to incorporate such understandings is not capable of fully 
addressing the financial feasibility of green investment. 
 
Addressing inequality  
• rising inequality is a potential danger in both a post-growth and a green growth world; but 
combatting inequality is entirely possible within both strategies; 
• key elements in the fight against inequality include:  
o increasing capital and energy productivity and slowing down the substitution of 
capital for labour;  
o protecting the rights of wage labour against excessive profit maximization by the 
owners of capital; 
o engaging in progressive taxation of income and introducing a low level of  taxation 
on capital; 
o introducing mechanisms for redistributing the ownership of capital and slowing 
down asymmetric accumulation in capital assets.   
 
Maintaining full employment  
• productivity-driven growth creates an inherent challenge to full employment; 
• the challenge of full employment in a post-growth economy arises primarily from the pursuit 
of labour productivity growth; 
• achieving full employment with declining growth rates can be achieved through two 
strategies:  
o reducing the hours worked per employee 
o reducing the rate of growth of labour productivity in the economy 
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• expansion of service-based economic activities represents a double dividend in terms of 
reducing environmental burdens and increasing employment (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: Direct and Indirect Employment and GHG Emissions per $m in 2010 in Canada 
Source: Jackson et al 2014 (Figure 2)38
 
 
Achieving financial stability  
• growth is not essential for the achievement of financial stability; but debt-fueled growth can 
lead to financial instability; 
• austerity policy presents a significant risk of economic instability; 
• countercyclical spending is a key element in the maintenance of financial stability; 
• balanced trade policy can reduce financial imbalances and (in some circumstances) tame the 
creation of asset price bubbles.  
 
Considerable uncertainties still attend the precise evolution of a convincing strategy for either green 
growth or for a post-growth economy.  But the principal elements of any strategy for meeting the 
                                                          
38  The results shown in Figure 15 are taken from an expanded version of the FALSTAFF framework 
which will eventually include a multi-sector input output structure and is part of the ongoing 
development of the Surrey/York led work.     
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challenges which have motivated this work are already clear and must include: a robust strategy for 
green investment, employment policy that is not simply contingent on high-growth, distributive 
policies to address severe disparities in income and wealth, and rigorous institutional requirements 
for financial stability. A particularly premium lies in strategies that offer multiple benefits or 
dividends in terms of the over-arching challenges articulated above.  
So, for example, a structural shift towards service-based activities (Figure 15) has the potential to 
help meet carbon targets and at the same time to improve employment outcomes.  Investment in 
energy productivity can reduce environmental impacts, improve trade balances and may in some 
circumstances contribute to redistribution towards wage labour (Figure 14).  Countercyclical 
spending strategies by government can reduce financial instability and help maintain full 
employment.    
Finally, it is to be noted that supposedly ‘fundamental’ objections to the feasibility of a post-growth 
economy are not supported by this research. There are in principle ways to achieve full employment, 
meet environmental targets, reduce income inequality and maintain financial stability even in the 
absence of exponential rates of growth. Encouragingly, our research also suggests that such a 
transition can be achieved without entirely dismantling the existing financial architecture of interest-
bearing debt. Nonetheless, there are some significant advantages associated with financial and 
monetary reform – including the potential for sovereign money creation. Not the least of these 
advantages is the potential for post-growth governments to reduce the cost of social investment and 
engage more easily in countercyclical spending.      
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